Wherever You Go, There You Are: Inserting Privacy Into Our Everyday Space
By: Anne Uteck
February 20, 2007
Note: this posting essentially represents snippets of my current research in progress.
Anyone familiar with J.K. Rowling’s world of Harry Potter cannot
help but be struck by its devices of wizardry. These devices provide
some idea of what it might mean to embody awareness in the physical
world, precisely the shift we will experience as computational power
moves beyond the desktop into everyday objects. Much of the charm from
this popular series comes from the quirky magic objects that surround
Harry and his friends. Rather than being solid and static, these
objects embody initiative and activity - read surveillance capability.
Take for example, the Pensieve which stores thoughts and memories for
later retrieval: think cameras, chips and tags that capture ever-bigger
parts of our experience, especially as they are integrated with devices
that know our agenda, the places we visit and the people we are meeting
with; or the Weasley’s clock - completely useless if you wanted to know
the time, but able to pinpoint where each family member might be, work,
school, home or even travelling, lost or in the hospital, and the
Marauder’s Map having icons that represent people as they move around
Hogwarts Castle: think geo-spatial technologies that bring the same
feature to open spaces. Next generation magic or next generation
technology? By whatever label, they prompt us to start thinking more
about space, the space of our everyday lives, how it is being
transformed and increasingly vulnerable to a new wave of technologies
that make us more visible and more exposed. This, in turn, raises
questions about spatial privacy, its nature and scope, and its
viability for legal protection.
Emerging location, or geo-spatial technologies, such as Global
Positioning Systems (GPS), Radio-Frequency-Identification (RFID) and
advanced wireless devices are being introduced into all facets of
everyday real life. This new wave of powerful technologies are finding
their way into our homes, cars, cellular phones, identification
documents and even into our clothing and bodies. Within the context of
growing technological convergence, they have the unique ability to
locate and track people and things anywhere, anytime and in real time.
There is nothing new, nor necessarily sinister about wanting to locate
people and objects and track their movement from one place to another.
Clearly, there are some compelling advantages to such enhanced
capability. For example, emergency services are better able to find
accident victims, commercial organizations are able to improve the way
they do business by fleet, product and employee tracking; parents may
want to be sure their children are safe; and retailers, stadiums and
other service-oriented facilities can adjust staffing levels and
product inventory to best accommodate consumer patterns. For government
intelligence and law enforcement, serving the public interest includes
managing risk, which translates into increased security applications
for monitoring people and things, especially given the shift towards a
safety and security state. Overcoming many of the limitations inherent
in the passive mainstream technologies, this generation of
location-based technologies makes all of these things possible,
automatically, remotely, accurately, continuously and in real time.
The obvious privacy and surveillance implications, however, are
staggering and these concerns are rendered more pressing and more
complex as the technologies are combined, integrated, connected,
invisibly and remotely to networks, forming part of a wider movement
towards a society characterized by ubiquitous computing (UBICOMP). In
the ubiquitous networked society, computing devices are embedded in
everyday objects and places with the potential for comprehensive
monitoring and surveillance that is not contained by space or time,
thus crossing both physical and social boundaries. This, in my view, is
deeply problematic because the core privacy interests individuals have
in sustaining personal, physical or even psychological space are
potentially diminished, particularly over the long term as networked
location technologies destabilize personal spheres and challenge our
fundamental ideas about personal space and boundaries and the privacy
expectations that go with them.
Canadian law, principally s.8 of the Charter, recognizes a
reasonable expectation of spatial privacy, and purportedly its
protection, at least in theory, extends to people. However, the
parameters have been confined to ownership or at least, the physicality
of the place. In other words, the territorial spectrum of protection
has been narrowly constructed by the Supreme Court of Canada. On the
current spatial assessment of privacy interests, you can point to
barriers that are sustaining its protection. In most cases it is a
tangible barrier that clearly delineates the boundary crossed
triggering section 8. However, even where there has been no actual
physical boundary crossed (trespassed), the intrusion has been assessed
as an expectation of privacy in the place under surveillance. In other
words, the context engaging section 8 protection is not what capacity
the person is acting, but where physically the person is and a tangible
boundary that can be identified as being crossed. As more of our lives
in private places, personal spaces and movement across all spaces are
potentially caught within a web of constant accessibility, the current
spatial privacy construct does not take into account the nature of
changing technologies, rendering irrelevant protections afforded by the
traditional analysis because there is no tangible boundary crossed and
the surveillance is capable of moving with people as they leave their
homes and move from place to place. The current spatial privacy
protection does not get at the core of what is ultimately
objectionable: our desire to limit intrusions into our space, affairs,
bodily sphere, attention paid to us, freedom from observation and of
movement without the threat of being watched – visible and exposed.
Thus, there is a need for a new conceptual apparatus for spatial
privacy capable of sustaining legal protection for the entire array of
privacy interests articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada.
Should we be concerned? Yes. Rhetoric and over-reaction? Perhaps.
However, identifying the need for a renewed consideration of spatial
privacy interests in response to location-based technologies is
compounded by an on-going concern, namely, that the discourse on
privacy and privacy protection has centered on assessing interests
principally in informational terms. I would go so far as to suggest
that the predominant theoretical, analytical and practical emphasis in
policy, legal and scholarly discourse has been on the data protection
model of informational privacy.
Spatial privacy interests have long been marginalized and largely
overlooked in the context of technology and surveillance. While
protecting information was a reasonable focus forty years ago when the
primary concerns related to the growth of information technologies and
the creation of large databases to store personal information, today
the privacy implications of new technologies are not just about data
processing or informational privacy interests. Moreover, data
protection laws and constitutional analysis of informational privacy do
not address the central threats to spatial privacy arising from
location-based technologies. Aside from the nature and quality of
information that may be gathered by the use of these technologies,
their embeddededness everywhere in the physical world calls for a
privacy assessment that more broadly considers people and their space.
In fact, the language of data protection and focus on an informational
analysis constrains a more robust discussion of privacy and risks
collapsing spatial privacy interests into the informational paradigm.
This is not to suggest that the baby be thrown out with the bathwater,
but it does reinforce the need to construct a more effective means by
which to bridge spatial, informational and personal privacy protection.
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