

CHAPTER

SCOPING ANONYMITY IN CASES OF COMPELLED DISCLOSURE OF IDENTITY: LESSONS FROM *BMG CANADA INC. v. JOHN DOE*¹

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Some people go online to share music – to explore the limits of their imaginations, to discover songs from various musical genres and to feel the beat of previous generations. In the U.S., sharing music across some peer-to-peer (P2P) networks is illegal.⁴ In Canada, it is not. Not yet.⁵

Some people go online to construct nyms – to engage in a social process of self-discovery by testing the plasticity of their identities and the social norms from which they are constituted. Individuals can use nyms to access and explore a wide variety of online materials that may help shape their identities, including books, films and music, for example. In the U.S., this form of personal exploration has been affected by litigation campaigns that have successfully sought to compel Internet service providers (ISPs) to disclose their customers' offline identities to copyright holders.⁶ In Canada, such campaigns have not enjoyed the same success. Not yet.⁷

Why did the Canada's Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal refuse to compel the disclosure of the identities of twenty-nine P2P file-sharers whom the Canadian Recording Industry Association (CRIA) wished to sue for copyright infringement? How did the court contour anonymity interests against copyright holders' interests? Should the decision be followed in other cases? What can be learned from this decision?

This chapter aims to address these questions and to reinforce the motif that we must tread carefully at the intersection between the procedures and policies supporting digital copyright enforcement and online privacy.

1. Anonymity

As many scholars have pointed out, there is little consensus as to whether our ability to disconnect our actions from our identities is, on balance, a good thing.⁸ Anonymity is like the Duke's toad – ugly and venomous, and yet it wears a precious jewel in its head.⁹

Ugly and venomous, because it disables accountability and enables wrongdoing. In the P2P context, an inability to ascertain the real-life identities of

geekboy@KaZaA, *mr_socks@KaZaA*, *chickiepoo25@KaZaA*¹⁰ and other file-sharers facilitates their ability to copy and disseminate music *en masse*, carefree and without a trace. Without knowing their identities, CRIA and other such organizations cannot sue these individuals and consequently cannot test the claim that file-sharers are engaging in illegal conduct.

If P2P networks were perfectly anonymous, copyright industries would have no means of legal recourse against individuals accused of copyright infringement. As Professor Lawrence Lessig once remarked, in its broader context, “[p]erfect anonymity makes perfect crime possible.”¹¹ While illegal copying of MP3s is unlikely to unravel civilization as we know it, a more generalized ability to commit perfect crime might. There are good reasons to fear a society in which people are able to act with impunity. Consequently, there are good reasons to fear perfectly anonymous P2P networks.

Though dangerous, anonymity is at the same time precious. It is Plato’s *pharmakon*,¹² a drug that is both poison and remedy. As Derrida might have described it: “[t]his charm, this spellbinding virtue, this power of fascination, can be - alternately or simultaneously-beneficent or maleficent.”¹³ The ability to use “nyms”—alternative identifiers that can encourage social experimentation and role playing—is “an important part of the rich fabric of human culture.”¹⁴ Anonymity facilitates the flow of information and communication on public issues, safeguards personal reputation and lends voice to individual speakers who might otherwise be silenced by fear of retribution.¹⁵ Nyms can be used to enhance privacy by controlling the collection, use and disclosure of personal information. Anonymity can also be used to protect people from unnecessary or unwanted intrusions and to “encourage attention to the content of a message or behavior rather than to the nominal characteristics of the messenger.”¹⁶

It is not our aim in this short chapter to resolve the conflicting value sets generated by the possibility of perfect anonymity, nor to make a case for some intermediate solution such as pseudonymous or traceable transactions. Although there are a number of technological applications seeking to create both such states of affairs,¹⁷ the typical uses of online nyms are much more leaky. That is, one nym can usually be associated with another or with other information to create a personal profile that enables identification – perfect anonymity is usually not possible online.

For example, “*geekboy@KaZaA*” is one kind of nym; “24.84.179.98” is another. The latter, sometimes referred to as an IP address, is a numeric identifier assigned to computers or devices on TCP/IP networks. IP addresses are easily discovered and observed as people transact online. The particular IP address referred to above is alleged to belong to the network device used by an individual whose KaZaA pseudonym is *geekboy@KaZaA*.

In the context of the recording industry's campaign against P2P file-sharers, as in other cases where parties wish to identify Internet users, finding out the IP address of a device is currently the best first step in uncovering the identity of an individual file-sharer. But the IP address is not enough. In order to sue, it is necessary to tie the device's IP address to a legal name. This is not always easy to do; at least not without help from a third party intermediary. In this case, the ISPs were the targeted intermediaries and they will be the focus of discussion in this chapter. However, the information might have been available from any intermediary, including from the operators of KaZaA or other P2P networks.

ISPs have increasingly become trusted holders of and gatekeepers to our personal information. ISPs hold information about many online activities, including information which ties individuals' pseudonymous surfing and downloading activities to their "real-world" identities. In this context, individuals trust and are dependent on ISPs to safeguard sensitive personal information and communications. Indeed, given the relationship between some ISPs and their subscribers, it is possible that the conditions for the imposition of fiduciary duties on ISPs might exist in some cases.¹⁸ Canadian courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada, continue to recognize the importance of maintaining a degree of privacy or confidentiality with respect to the personal information held by ISPs. Especially so when it comes to linking legal names or other common identifiers to particular IP addresses. As one member of the Supreme Court of Canada recently held:

[an individual's surfing and downloading activities] tend to reveal core biographical information about a person. Privacy interests of individuals will be directly implicated where owners of copyrighted works or their collective societies attempt to retrieve data from Internet Service Providers about an end user's downloading of copyrighted works. We should therefore be chary of adopting a test that may encourage such monitoring.¹⁹

In *BMG v. Doe*, Canada's Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal were forced to confront the conflict between copyright enforcement and privacy, head-on, when CRIA commenced a litigation campaign against P2P file-sharers "in parallel" with the one commenced by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA). *BMG v. Doe* is an important comparative IP and cyberlaw case because it forces courts to consider a judicial test for determining when ISPs should be compelled to disclose their customers' identities to copyright owners.

2. *BMG V. DOE*

On March 31, 2004, the Federal Court issued a widely-publicized ruling in *BMG v. Doe*. This decision propelled Canada into the international spotlight because of the Court's statements regarding the legality of sharing music files on P2P networks.²⁰ The media coverage tended to obfuscate the other issue central to the decision, which focused on whether the privacy concerns in the case outweighed the interest of a private party in obtaining discovery in civil litigation.

On appeal in 2005, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld the lower court ruling, though it modified it somewhat and downplayed the lower court's comments regarding copyright law. Although the appellate ruling lowered the threshold on one aspect of the test for disclosure of identities, other aspects of the ruling may effectively have raised the level of privacy protection afforded to online nym.

BMG v. Doe is significant because it may have set the threshold test for future cases in Canada and perhaps elsewhere, in which courts are asked to compel ISPs to link individuals' online nym—specifically their IP addresses—to their offline identities.

1.1 Nature of the case

BMG v. Doe involved an impressive matrix of fifty-three organizations and individuals, divided into four categories as follows:

Plaintiffs: seventeen music recording companies who were members of CRIA (collectively “CRIA”);

Defendants: twenty-nine unnamed individuals identified only by their P2P pseudonyms and IP addresses;

Non-party respondents: five of Canada's largest telecommunications and cable ISPs: Shaw Communications Inc., Telus Inc., Rogers Cable Communications Inc., Bell Sympatico, Vidéotron Ltée. (collectively the “ISPs”); and

Interveners: Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) and Electronic Frontier Canada (collectively the “Interveners”).²¹

The case began in February 2004 when CRIA commenced a copyright infringement lawsuit against the Defendants, alleging that the Defendants had unlawfully shared copyrighted music files on P2P networks. CRIA could only identify the Defendants by their P2P pseudonyms and IP addresses.

CRIA immediately brought a preliminary motion (the “Motion”) seeking to compel the ISPs to release the identities of the twenty-nine unknown subscribers. The initial reactions of the ISPs differed widely, with Shaw taking the strongest stand to protect its subscribers’ privacy. With the exception of Vidéotron, all of the ISPs opposed the Motion in Federal Court. The Interveners also opposed the Motion.

1.2 Evidence

1.2.1 CRIA’s evidence

The bulk of CRIA’s evidence in support of the Motion came from Mr. Millin, the President of MediaSentry. MediaSentry is a New York company that CRIA had hired to gather evidence of copyright infringement on P2P networks.

Millin explained that his company had searched P2P networks for files corresponding to CRIA’s copyrighted sound recordings and then randomly downloaded such files from each Defendant between October and December 2003. He claimed that MediaSentry was able to determine the IP address of each Defendant at the time MediaSentry downloaded the files. Using the American Registry for Internet Numbers,²² MediaSentry was then able to determine to which ISPs the IP addresses had been assigned at the relevant times. This allowed MediaSentry to determine the ISP through which each Defendant had been sharing the files.

During cross-examination, Millin admitted that he had not listened to the files that MediaSentry downloaded. He also acknowledged that linking an IP address to a subscriber account would identify only the ISP subscriber, not necessarily the P2P user engaged in file-sharing. For example, Millin admitted that an ISP account may have hundreds of users on a local area network or that a wireless router might be used by any number of authorized and unauthorized users to engage in file-sharing.

Finally, Millin explained that MediaSentry used files called “MediaDecoys” as part of its work with CRIA. “MediaDecoys” are files that appear, based on their filenames, to be copyrighted songs. However, once a P2P user downloads and opens such a file, the user discovers that the file is actually inoperative. Such measures are designed to reduce the attractiveness of P2P networks by frustrating P2P users. Because Millin did not listen to any of the files downloaded by MediaSentry, he admitted that he did not know whether any of those files were in fact MediaDecoy files, thus rendering impossible a determination in any given instance whether CRIA-owned content was in fact being shared.

1.2.2 ISPs' evidence

Three ISPs—Shaw, Telus and Rogers—were the only parties to file evidence opposing the Motion. Neither Bell nor Vidéotron filed evidence and, by order of the Court, the Interveners were not permitted to file evidence.

Shaw and Telus gave evidence that they almost always assigned IP addresses to their subscribers “dynamically.” This means that each time a subscriber went online, the subscriber would be randomly assigned a new IP address for that session. Shaw stated that it did not keep historical records of which IP addresses were assigned to particular subscribers at particular times. For this and other technical reasons, Shaw’s evidence indicated that it could not, with the degree of certainty required, provide the personal information sought by CRIA. This was a point of difference between the ISPs which is important to bear in mind for the discussion of *Lawful Access* under Part 3 below. Shaw also registered its concern about potential legal liability in fulfilling CRIA’s request; for example, the liability that might arise if it incorrectly matched an IP address to a subscriber, even through no fault of its own.

Telus gave evidence that it did not have any records of the information sought by CRIA and that it had no commercial reason to maintain those kinds of records. Multiple databases would have to be cross-referenced in order to search for and produce the information sought by CRIA. Further, Telus stated that the longer the delay between an event and Telus’s search, the less reliable the information would become. This turned out to be an important evidentiary point since MediaSentry had gathered CRIA’s evidence as early as October 2003, roughly six months before the hearing. Finally, Telus provided evidence about how responding to CRIA requests would be costly and disruptive to Telus’s operations, particularly if such requests were made in significant numbers in the future.

Rogers provided evidence indicating that it had some information about eight of the nine Rogers subscribers targeted by CRIA and that it had sent notice of the CRIA lawsuit to almost all of those subscribers. Rogers indicated that it generally retained the kind of information sought by CRIA for a period of six days.

Although Bell did not file evidence, Bell’s counsel advised the Court that Bell had already identified and was holding information about all of the targeted Bell customers. Bell’s counsel also echoed concerns raised by the other ISPs about compensation for ISPs’ costs to comply with a disclosure order.

1.3 Privacy arguments in *BMG v. Doe*²³

1.3.1 CRIA's arguments

CRIA argued that the following seven-part test should be applied by the Court in deciding whether to compel disclosure of the identities of the ISP subscribers:

1. Is there a *prima facie*, or *bona fide* case, at least, of copyright infringement?
2. Is there a relationship between the ISPs and the alleged infringers?
3. Do the ISPs have information about the identities of the alleged infringers?
4. Are the ISPs the only practical source of the information sought?
5. Is the information necessary for CRIA to proceed with its lawsuit?
6. Would the information sought be compellable at trial and useful to CRIA's case?
7. Is there any interest, privacy or otherwise, that would outweigh the ISP's duty to disclose the identity of the alleged infringers?

Privacy concerns figure into the first and last elements of this test. They arise under the first element in the sense that privacy concerns might justify a higher evidentiary threshold at the preliminary stage of the lawsuit. For example, the requirement of proving a *prima facie* case of infringement would be a higher threshold than proving a mere *bona fide* (good faith) case. CRIA did not draw a distinction between these evidentiary thresholds, arguing, in any event, that it had satisfied either threshold.

Privacy might arise under the last element of the test as a factor which could prevent disclosure outright. With respect to this element, CRIA argued that there were no privacy concerns at issue in the Motion that would outweigh CRIA's interest in having disclosure in order to sue the alleged infringers.

CRIA asserted that Canadian privacy law did not prevent disclosure because the law expressly permitted disclosure without an individuals' consent where required by an order of a court.²⁴ CRIA also argued that the ISP subscribers had already consented to disclosure in the circumstances (where violation of a legal right was at issue) by agreeing to such provisions in their ISPs' "acceptable use" agreements, upon subscribing to the ISPs' services.

CRIA further argued that many of the privacy concerns raised by the other parties to the Motion were diminished by virtue of the fact that there was little likelihood that the Defendants' Internet activities at large would be associated with their actual identities on the basis of merely providing CRIA with the link between their P2P usernames, IP addresses and their legal names, as sought by the order.

Finally, in response to the ISP's evidence and arguments, CRIA claimed that the ISPs were able to identify the subscribers because, for example, Shaw and Rogers admitted that they had done so in response to police or other requests on numerous occasions in the past.

1.3.2 ISPs' arguments

Shaw sought to protect its customers' personal information in accordance with Canadian privacy law, in part because it could be held accountable to its customers or to Canada's Federal Privacy Commissioner. Shaw expressly adopted parts of CIPPIC's argument and asserted that there were substantial privacy interests at stake which required the Court to impose a high standard—a "strong *prima facie* case"—on CRIA before ordering disclosure. Shaw argued that the CRIA request amounted to a civil search warrant in circumstances where there was no legal authority for such a warrant and where there were no privacy protections for the targets of the inquiry.

In terms of whether the test had been met, Shaw claimed that CRIA had not made out a *prima facie* case of copyright infringement. For example, Shaw asserted that there was no evidence as to how CRIA linked the P2P pseudonyms to the IP addresses and no evidence that anyone at CRIA had listened to the downloaded songs.

Telus stated that it had no documents sought by CRIA and characterized the Motion as a mandatory order conscripting Telus to conduct investigations for CRIA and to create documents for CRIA without concern for the impact it would have on Telus and without concern for the reliability of the information produced. This was a time-consuming and costly process which would be disruptive to Telus's ordinary course of business. It was also something for which Telus argued it might face liability to its customers. Telus suggested that CRIA should have asked KaZaA and other P2P companies for the information sought before coming to the ISPs.

Rogers made brief arguments, asserting that the order sought by CRIA was extraordinary and that CRIA should be required to produce evidence commensurate with the nature of the order sought. Rogers also asserted that the form of order sought by CRIA should be more restrictive. For example, Rogers submitted that if the order were granted, Rogers should only be required to produce the last known name and address of the account holders at issue.

Finally, Bell took a relatively neutral approach in its argument by highlighting issues and questions that the Court should consider. Bell submitted that the Court should only make an order for disclosure of personal information where the moving party has made out a *prima facie* case based on admissible evidence. Bell asserted that there was no evidence as to how the IP addresses of the alleged

Defendants were linked to the pseudonyms and that the affidavits filed by CRIA were not based on personal knowledge.

1.3.3 CIPPIC's arguments

CIPPIC filed a substantial written brief regarding privacy and copyright issues. Drawing on a number of Supreme Court of Canada search and seizure cases and Canada's recently enacted private-sector privacy laws, CIPPIC asserted that there were fundamental privacy values at stake in the case, demanding that a high threshold test be applied before identity should be disclosed. These values included protection of informational privacy which the Supreme Court had expressly recognized in Canada.²⁵ In explaining why the threshold test was critical from a privacy perspective, CIPPIC pointed to *R. v. Dymnt* where the Supreme Court of Canada stated that "if privacy of the individual is to be protected, we cannot afford to wait to vindicate it only after it has been violated."²⁶

Further justifying a high threshold test, CIPPIC advanced arguments regarding the particular importance of online privacy and anonymity:

The Internet provides an unprecedented forum for freedom of expression and democracy. The ability to engage in anonymous communications adds significantly to the Internet's value as a forum for free expression. Anonymity permits speakers to communicate unpopular or unconventional ideas without fear of retaliation, harassment, or discrimination. It allows people to explore unconventional ideas and to pursue research on sensitive personal topics without fear of embarrassment.

If the Plaintiffs are able, by virtue of a court order, to link an IP address (*e.g.*, 66.51.0.34) and a KaZaA user name to a presumptive "real world" person (*e.g.*, John Smith), and thus commence an action against that person, the action could connect information about John Smith to the world (with consequences beyond the scope of the allegation). For example, John Smith might have visited a Web site on sexually-transmitted diseases, posted or shared documents criticizing the government or his employer, discussed his religious beliefs using a pseudonym in a chat room, or virtually any other type of expression. John Smith would likely hold an assumption that he was and would remain anonymous in many of these activities. The effect of the Court order in this case would shatter that anonymity and potentially cause significant embarrassment and irreparable harm to John Smith, independent of and prior to a determination of his culpability. It would have a corresponding chilling effect on free speech and online activity generally.²⁷ During oral argument, CIPPIC expanded on this hypothetical in response to a question from the Justice von Finckenstein. CIPPIC pointed out that P2P systems can be used to share virtually any kind of document, software, music, video or other types of files. In fact, CIPPIC was able to point the Court to actual examples

of documents and pictures being shared by some of the Defendants. CIPPIC argued that this sharing had been done on an assumption of anonymity and that to reveal the identity of those sharing files would effectively shatter their anonymity much more broadly. This point was later specifically embraced by the Federal Court of Appeal, which held that the investigation by CRIA must be limited to relevant information only.²⁸

CIPPIC asserted that CRIA should have to provide clear evidence of the alleged infringement, clear evidence of copyright ownership and clear evidence that they have identified the correct defendants. CIPPIC also pointed out that where a case is unlikely to proceed to trial after an interlocutory order is made, courts will and should engage in a more extensive review of the merits of plaintiffs' claims. CIPPIC and Shaw argued that this was important because if disclosure was ordered, CRIA would likely follow the aggressive approach adopted by the RIAA in the US, which pressed defendants to immediately engage in "settlement discussions" – a potentially problematic practice when one considers the vast inequality in bargaining power between the plaintiff and defendants.

1.4 The Federal Court decision

The Federal Court began its decision with a cursory review of the facts and then adopted the description of how P2P systems work set forth in *Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster*.²⁹ In terms of the legal issues, the Court framed the case by raising three questions, each of which involves balancing privacy against other considerations: (i) "What legal test should the Court apply before ordering disclosure?"; (ii) "Have the Plaintiffs met the test?"; and (iii) "If an order is issued, what should be the scope and terms of such order?"

1.4.1 What legal test should the Court apply before ordering disclosure?

Justice von Finckenstein of the Federal Court held that the following five criteria must be satisfied before a disclosure order would be made:

- a) The Plaintiff must establish a *prima facie* case against the Defendants;
- b) The ISPs must be in some way involved in the matter under dispute (*i.e.* the ISPs must be more than innocent bystanders);
- c) The ISPs must be the only practical source of the information;
- d) The ISPs must be reasonably compensated for their expenses arising out of compliance with the order, in addition to their legal costs; and

- e) The public interests in favour of disclosure must outweigh legitimate privacy concerns.

These five elements comprise the threshold test established in this case. Although not all of these factors bear on privacy in an obvious way, it is important to consider the Court's findings with respect to each factor because they could have an impact, on what we characterize as *a broader public interest in privacy*, as discussed below in part 3.

1.4.2 Have the Plaintiffs met the test?

The Court concluded that CRIA did not meet the test for disclosure because: (i) CRIA did not make out a *prima facie* case; (ii) CRIA did not establish that the ISPs were the only practical source of the information; and (iii) the privacy concerns in the case outweighed the public interest in disclosure. The Court's analysis followed each factor of the threshold test as follows.³⁰

Factor 1: CRIA must establish a prima facie case against the Defendants. The Court found that there were three deficiencies in the *prima facie* copyright infringement case advanced by CRIA. First, the Millin affidavit was deficient because it was not based on personal knowledge and gave no reason for his beliefs. The Court also remarked that Millin had not listened to any of the downloaded files and in particular did not know if they were MediaDecoy files. On this basis, it concluded that there was "no evidence before the Court as to whether or not the files offered for uploading are infringed files of the Plaintiffs."³¹

Second, the Court noted that Millin had not explained how MediaSentry linked the P2P pseudonyms to specific IP addresses. Therefore, the Court concluded that it would be "irresponsible" for the Court to order disclosure:

There is no evidence explaining how the pseudonym "Geekboy@KaZaA" was linked to IP address 24.84.179.98 in the first place. Without any evidence at all as to how IP address 24.84.179.98 has been traced to Geekboy@KaZaA, and without being satisfied that such evidence is reliable, it would be irresponsible for the Court to order the disclosure of the name of the account holder of IP address 24.84.179.98 and expose this individual to a law suit by the plaintiffs.³²

Finally, Justice von Finckenstein found that CRIA had not provided any evidence that copyright infringement had taken place under Canadian law.

Factor 2: The ISPs must be more than innocent bystanders. The Court found that the ISPs were not mere bystanders because they are the means by which file-sharers access the Internet and connect with one another. Although the Court did not specifically say so, its recognition that ISPs play the role of gatekeeper is consistent with the view that there is a legal relationship between ISPs and those

who use their services; a relationship which may create privacy-related obligations that are not applicable to innocent bystanders.

Factor 3: The ISPs must be the only practical source of the information. The Court found that it could not make a determination on this issue because CRIA had not described the entities that operate P2P systems, where they are located or whether the names corresponding to the pseudonyms could be obtained from the P2P operators. For example, Telus's evidence suggested that CRIA may be able to obtain the identities from KaZaA in cases where users had signed up for "KaZaA Plus" and would therefore be billed by KaZaA.

Factor 4: The ISPs must be reasonably compensated for their expenses. The Court concluded that the process sought to be imposed by CRIA would be costly and divert the ISPs' resources from other tasks. The Court held that ISPs would need to be compensated for their reasonable costs as well as their legal costs of responding to the Motion.

Factor 5: The public interests in favour of disclosure must outweigh legitimate privacy concerns. The Court began the heart of its privacy analysis by noting that "it is unquestionable but that the protection of privacy is of utmost importance to Canadian society."³³ The Court cited with approval passages from *Irwin Toy v. Doe*, which articulated the value of privacy on the Internet:

In keeping with the protocol or etiquette developed in the usage of the internet, some degree of privacy or confidentiality with respect to the identity of the internet protocol address of the originator of a message has significant safety value and is in keeping with what should be perceived as being good public policy. As far as I am aware, there is no duty or obligation upon the internet service provider to voluntarily disclose the identity of an internet protocol address, or to provide that information upon request.³⁴

The Court in *BMG v. Doe* noted, however, that privacy is not absolute and cannot be used to insulate anonymous persons from civil or criminal liability. Because courts are required to balance one individual's privacy rights against the rights of other individuals and the public interest, the Court recognized that CRIA had legitimate copyrights in their works and were entitled to protect them against infringement. Thus, the Court recognized that CRIA had an interest in compelling disclosure of the identities of the peer-to-peer file-sharers. The Court also implied that there was a public interest favouring disclosure in litigation so that parties are not denied the ability to bring and try their legal claims merely because they cannot identify the alleged wrongdoers.³⁵ Consequently, it held that the privacy concerns in the case must be balanced against CRIA's interest and the broader interest that it stands for.

In its analysis of the privacy concerns, the Court held that the reliability and scope of the personal information sought by CRIA were the most significant

factors to consider. The information sought must be reliable and ought not to exceed the minimum that would be necessary in order to permit CRIA to identify the alleged wrongdoers.³⁶ Here, the Court held that CRIA had sought too much information from the ISPs and that the information sought was not sufficiently reliable to justify disclosure:

In this case the evidence was gathered in October, November and December 2003. However, the notice of motion requesting disclosure by the ISPs was not filed until February 11, 2004. This clearly makes the information more difficult to obtain, if it can be obtained at all, and decreases its reliability. No explanation was given by the plaintiffs as to why they did not move earlier than February 2004. *Under these circumstances, given the age of the data, its unreliability and the serious possibility of an innocent account holder being identified, this Court is of the view that the privacy concerns outweigh the public interest concerns in favour of disclosure.*³⁷

In the above passage, the Court expressly mentions the age of the data as contributing to its unreliability. Perhaps even more importantly, its reference to the “serious possibility of an innocent account holder being identified” ought to be understood in reference to the lack of an evidentiary link between P2P pseudonyms and IP addresses. Even on the assumption that a given ISP is able to accurately link IP addresses to its customers’ legal names, without being able to prove the connection between online pseudonyms and IP addresses, the Court determined that CRIA is unable to ensure that it is seeking to compel disclosure of the identities of the appropriate individuals. As a result of these weighty privacy concerns, the Court refused to compel disclosure.

1.4.3 If an order is issued, what should be the scope and terms of such order?

Although the Court did not order disclosure in this case, it did propose a privacy-protective framework for orders that might be granted in future cases. The Court noted that if an order for disclosure had been made, certain restrictions would have been needed to protect the privacy of the Defendants because “the invasion of privacy should always be as limited as possible.”³⁸

First, the use of subscriber names by CRIA would be strictly limited to substituting the John Doe and Jane Doe names in the lawsuit. Second, the P2P pseudonyms would be used as proxies for the legal names for the Defendants on the Statement of Claim. This would protect the names of the subscribers from public disclosure, at least initially. An annex (protected by a confidentiality order) would be added to the Statement of Claim relating each P2P pseudonym to the legal name and address of a particular ISP account holder. Finally, the ISPs would be required to disclose only the name and last known address of each account

holder. These kinds of protections would provide the information CRIA needed to proceed with a given claim while, at the same time, provide a measure of privacy protection to Defendants.

1.5 The Federal Court of Appeal decision

The Federal Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the lower court, with some modification. Like the lower court, the appeals court began its decision by affirming the significance of individuals' online privacy concerns in our modern information society:

Citizens legitimately worry about encroachment upon their privacy rights. The potential for unwarranted intrusion into individual personal lives is now unparalleled. In an era where people perform many tasks over the Internet, it is possible to learn where one works, resides or shops, his or her financial information, the publications one reads and subscribes to and even specific newspaper articles he or she has browsed. This intrusion not only puts individuals at great personal risk but also subjects their views and beliefs to untenable scrutiny.³⁹

Later in its decision, however, the appeals court noted that privacy would not always trump other interests and that the plaintiffs had an important interest in being able to pursue their alleged claims of copyright infringement against the anonymous Internet users targeted.⁴⁰ Indeed, the appeals court held that where the plaintiffs could show a "bona fide" legal claim, the plaintiffs have a *right* to know who the targeted individuals are.⁴¹

In the result, the Federal Court of Appeal reached largely the same conclusions as the lower court, particularly on the determinative issue of the quality of CRIA's evidence:

...the evidence purporting to connect the pseudonyms with the IP addresses was hearsay thus creating the risk that innocent persons might have their privacy invaded and also be named as defendants where it is not warranted. Without this evidence there is no basis upon which the motion can be granted and for this reason alone the appeal should be dismissed.⁴²

The main difference between the decisions of the lower court and the appeals court was on the first element of the threshold test. The appeals court held that a *prima facie* case put the plaintiffs to too high a standard; it lowered the standard to a *bona fide* (good faith) claim.⁴³ The difference between these thresholds was not explained in the decision. Although the appeal court's analysis followed the elements of the test identified by the lower court, when all of the considerations

identified at different points in the appeal court decision are brought together, the following test emerges from the case:

Test for Disclosure

1. In order to obtain disclosure, CRIA must show the following:

(a) There should not be a risk that innocent people will have their privacy invaded or that innocent people will be named as defendants.⁴⁴ In this case, the risk arose from the weakness in CRIA's evidence (as mentioned above). In another case, the risk may arise in a different way; and

(b) "A *bona fide* (good faith) claim that unknown persons are infringing their copyright,"⁴⁵ including "*i.e.* that they really do intend to bring an action based on the information they obtain, and that there is no other improper purpose for seeing the identity of these persons".⁴⁶

2. CRIA must also provide clear admissible evidence demonstrating that the ISPs are the only source of the identity information, for example, by showing that they cannot obtain the identities from another source, such as KaZaA.⁴⁷

3. If CRIA meets each of the first two elements of this test, then the court must ask whether the public interest in disclosure (to permit the plaintiffs to pursue their claims) outweighs legitimate privacy concerns.⁴⁸ In weighing this consideration in this case, the appeals court noted two concerns:

(a) There should be no undue delay between gathering the evidence and filing the motion for disclosure.⁴⁹ This relates to factor 1(b) of this test since it relates to the level of risk that innocent people may be exposed based on dated or unreliable evidence; and

(b) In gathering evidence in support of the motion, CRIA must "limit the acquisition of information to the copyright infringement issue".⁵⁰ If not so limited, a court could refuse disclosure. The court also noted that the ISPs might face adverse consequences if CRIA was overbroad in its investigation:

If private information irrelevant to the copyright issues is extracted, and disclosure of the user's identity is made, the recipient of the information may then be in possession of highly confidential information about the user. If this information is unrelated to copyright infringement, this would

be an unjustified intrusion into the rights of the user and might well amount to a breach of PIPEDA by the ISPs, leaving them open to prosecution.⁵¹

These concerns may or may not be relevant in a future case, or other concerns may be applicable.

4. Finally, even where all of the elements of the test are met and a court has decided that disclosure should be made, the appeals court warned future courts that “caution must be exercised by the courts in ordering such disclosure, to make sure that privacy rights are invaded in the most minimal way”.⁵² Specific directions should be given as to the type of information disclosed and the manner in which it can be used. This may include a confidentiality order or identifying defendants by initials only.⁵³

3. Lessons from *BMG v. Doe*

BMG v. Doe sends a clear message to future plaintiffs – they should limit their investigation to minimize privacy invasion and come to court with solid evidence of the alleged wrongdoing as well as solid evidence of a reliable link between the alleged activity and specific individuals. Without this kind of evidence, privacy concerns may militate against disclosure, as they did in this case. Further, even where privacy concerns do not justify refusing disclosure outright, *BMG v. Doe* also sends a message to future courts that any invasion of privacy should be limited and minimized by protective measures in the disclosure order. For these reasons, *BMG v. Doe* must unquestionably be read as a victory for privacy and as an endorsement for preserving online anonymity unless there are strong reasons to justify compelling the disclosure of identity.

On the other hand, a number of the findings in *BMG v. Doe* may quite unintentionally diminish Internet privacy in the future. Recall that the result in *BMG v. Doe* turned on the inadequate evidence provided by CRIA. The decisions openly invite CRIA to come back to court with better evidence of wrongdoing in a future case. Such an invitation may well result in even closer scrutiny of Internet users targeted by CRIA, both to establish a reliable link between their pseudonyms and their IP address and to carefully document the kinds of activities that the individuals were engaged in for the purpose of attempting to show a *prima facie* copyright violation. Although the Federal Court of Appeal importantly made clear that CRIA (and by extension future plaintiffs) must limit their investigation to relevant material in order to minimize privacy invasion, the decision could motivate the development of even more powerful, more invasive, surreptitious

technological means of tracking people online. This increased surveillance might be seen as necessary by potential litigants in any number of situations where one party to an action, seeking to compel disclosure of identity information from an ISP, is motivated to spy on the other, set traps and perhaps even create new nyms in order to impersonate other peer-to-peer file-sharers with the hope of frustrating them, intimidating them, or building a case against them.

Still, there are good reasons in favour of following the appellate decision in *BMG v. Doe* in future cases. Independent of the copyright claims, the serious deficiencies in CRIA's evidence—particularly the lack of a link between the pseudonyms and the IP addresses—is itself a sufficient reason to reject disclosure, even if privacy protections were built into an order. The privacy limitation placed on CRIA's investigative techniques is also an important development. In its appeal factum, CIPPIC elaborated on the reasons why the evidentiary issues are so important:

The Appellants [CRIA] have relied upon automated computer systems to gather and generate evidence in support of their motion. They have not disclosed the details of how these systems work. Without explaining how the error was made, the Appellants admit that they made an error in one of the IP addresses at issue - rather than 64.231.255.184, one of the targeted IP addresses should be 64.231.254.117.

...

When dealing with this kind of evidence in support of such extraordinary *ex parte* relief, the court should be presented with frank and full disclosure. For example, full disclosure might include an explanation from an independent expert as to how the P2P pseudonyms are linked to IP addresses (along with a solid documentary backup to put the explanation beyond doubt in every case). One incorrect number in an IP address means all the difference to the innocent person that would be exposed by the order sought.⁵⁴

The real challenge for future courts will not simply be the determination of whether or not to grant a disclosure order. The real challenge will be to formulate and then clearly articulate general principles about how to account for privacy and other interests in a way that accommodates the many concerns expressed above. In so doing, it will be crucial for courts to recognize that any such exercise does not merely involve weighing the privacy interests of the individual defendants against CRIA (or other plaintiffs) and the public interest in permitting parties to proceed with lawsuits. *There is a broader public interest in privacy that must also be considered.*

This broader public interest in privacy on the Internet has been hinted at in other Canadian cases.⁵⁵ To the extent that *BMG v. Doe* may result in privacy invasions through increased monitoring and surreptitious surveillance, this broader

public interest in privacy must be taken into account in the analysis of how, when and why disclosure should be ordered or rejected. The broader interest must also be taken into account in crafting express privacy-based limits around plaintiffs' investigations of individuals' online activities. As one Supreme Court of Canada Justice recently acknowledged, courts considering the intersection of copyright and privacy should "be chary of adopting a test that may encourage [the monitoring of an individual's surfing and downloading activities]."⁵⁶

One final lesson to be learned from *BMG v. Doe* is that the view of the ISP as the trusted guardian of its customers' privacy may soon be relegated to the past.⁵⁷ In the early days of the world wide web, most commercial ISPs put a sincere premium on their customers' privacy and, at that time, were in a plausible position to do so.⁵⁸ More recently, ISPs and other intermediaries, including major Internet search engines,⁵⁹ have faced reputational pressure to protect privacy. This pressure is particularly present where one major ISP breaks from the pack and indicates that it will protect its subscribers' privacy, thereby creating intense pressure for other ISPs to follow suit.

However, in the time that has passed since those heady days, the ISP-customer relationship has become more complex.⁶⁰ Although some of the ISPs involved in *BMG v. Doe* continue to play a role in advocating their customers' privacy, perhaps partly as a result of the pressure imposed by Shaw's strong lead to protect privacy in the case, others have chosen to play a lesser role, despite indications in their corporate privacy policies that claim a "longstanding commitment to safeguarding [subscribers'] right to privacy"⁶¹ and an "eager[ness] to ensure protection of information carried over the Internet and respect for [subscribers'] privacy."⁶²

One reason for this may be that the business of ISPs is no longer merely that of providing Internet access. For example, some Canadian ISPs have entered into the music downloading business.⁶³ Bell offers its customers music downloading through a service called Puretracks.⁶⁴ Indeed, Bell's partnership with Puretracks more recently led to Bell purchasing a majority share interest in the company.⁶⁵ Vidéotron, on the other hand, is wholly owned by Quebecor Media Inc.⁶⁶ which provides its own music downloading service through another subsidiary company, Archambault Group Inc.⁶⁷ It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Vidéotron did not oppose CRIA's motion in *BMG v. Doe*. In fact, on appeal, Vidéotron supported CRIA's position on the copyright issues, leaving little doubt about where it stands on the issues in the case: "[Vidéotron] agrees to protect its clients' privacy. [Vidéotron] does not agree to protect its clients' piracy."⁶⁸ As the ISP industry continues to evolve, it will be interesting to see whether other ISPs might follow Vidéotron's example.

Another reason why ISPs are no longer the trusted guardians of privacy they once were is the increasing role that ISPs are being forced to play in aiding

international law enforcement and the fight against cybercrime and terrorism.⁶⁹ Recognizing that ISPs are not only the pipeline of online communication but also the reservoirs of their customers' personal information and private communications, cybercrime legislation proposed or enacted in many jurisdictions—including legislative reforms currently under consideration in Canada⁷⁰—will be used to expedite criminal investigations by substantially reducing the threshold tests required to obtain a judicial order for various forms of state surveillance. In other words, ISPs will be compelled to disclose identity information in a number of circumstances without anyone having to come before a judge and prove that the privacy rights of the individual under investigation and the broader public interest in protecting personal privacy are outweighed by the public interest in investigating cybercrime.

Canada's *Lawful Access*⁷¹ agenda is one example of where ISPs may be forced to play a bigger role in aiding law enforcement. Under the current system, each major ISP in Canada has a different network architecture. The differences can be particularly significant between telecommunications and cable ISPs. These differences have important implications for privacy protection because the abilities of various ISPs to capture and retain information relating to the identity of their subscribers can differ greatly. This difference is reflected in the different ISP responses in the *BMG v. Doe* case – for example, Shaw and Telus claimed that they had none of the information sought by CRIA and Bell claimed that it had all of the information. Under *Lawful Access*, this will change as certain providers will be forced to re-engineer their networks to provide law enforcement with easy access to data.

As Professor Michael Geist has noted, *Lawful Access* will create a baseline standard for all ISPs' data retention and network configurations that will make it far easier for identity information to be obtained from them. This easier access to identity information will undoubtedly spill over from the law enforcement context to the civil actions. At the very least, ISPs will no longer be able to argue that they do not have the information sought. The reputational pressure on ISPs to protect privacy may also become negligible.

Finally, cost is another reason why ISPs may no longer be trusted guardians of privacy. When law enforcement or private parties have knocked on ISPs' doors seeking identity information to date, the first concern of the ISPs has often been "Who is going to pay for this?" Provided that ISPs are reimbursed for their costs of providing the information, ISPs will likely put up little privacy-based resistance to initiatives like *Lawful Access* and notice-and-takedown, or in civil actions like *BMG v. Doe*. Cost was a central issue for the ISPs in *BMG v. Doe*.

As is the case in private sector disputes such as *BMG v. Doe*, some members of Canadian civil society⁷² are also intervening in public sector hearings in order to ensure that the legal thresholds for compelling ISPs to disclose their customers'

personal identity information are not diminished in the public law context as a result of Canada's *Lawful Access* agenda.

4. Conclusion

As *BMG v. Doe* is considered by future courts, it is uncertain whether the *privacy values* articulated in the case—a case that will ultimately become known and remembered as *a-case-about-copyright*—will be affirmed and applied in future cases. We live in interesting times. At the same time that CRIA and other powerful private sector entities continuously intensify their growing arsenals of powerful new surveillance technologies, governments are seeking to pass laws which make it easier to obtain and make use of the personal information and communications that those private sector surveillance technologies are able to collect in their ever-growing databases, often without the consent of those about whom the information is being collected, used or disclosed to others.

One of the pioneers of the Internet, Stewart Brand, famously said that: “[o]nce a new technology rolls over you, if you’re not part of the steamroller, you’re part of the road.”⁷³ This unseemly prospect is so powerful, so compelling that it paves an attitude in some of those in opposition to the value set underlying the dominant technology to develop bigger steamrollers and steer them in the opposite direction. There is little doubt that for a small subset of those who cherish P2P file-sharing, the answer to CRIA and surveillance technologies like those used by MediaSentry will be the development of an extremely potent anonymous P2P network.⁷⁴ Such systems would enable Lessig’s horrific vision: “[p]erfect anonymity makes perfect crime possible.”⁷⁵

For the many netizens who see social value in the ability to exist online and off in various states of nymity, and who abhor those others who intentionally exploit anonymity as nothing more than a means of escaping accountability for immoral or illegal acts, the steamroller mentality is not a promising road. Our courts and legislatures need to pave other paths.

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¹ *BMG Canada Inc. v. Doe*, (2005) 252 D.L.R. (4th) 342 (F.C.A.), (2005), 39 C.P.R. (4th) 97, 2005 FCA 193, aff'd (2004) 239 D.L.R. (4th) 726, (2004), 32 C.P.R. (4th) 64, 2004 FC 488. An earlier version of this chapter was published as: Ian Kerr & Alex Cameron, "Nyms, P2P & ISPs" in Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu, eds. *Privacy and Technologies of Identity: A Cross-Disciplinary Conversation* (Springer, 2005).

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⁴ *A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).

⁵ See e.g. *BMG v. Doe*, *supra* note 1 at para 54 (expressly refusing to rule on the copyright infringement claims one way or another).

⁶ See, e.g., Aymar Jean, 'U' releases student identities to RIAA, *The Michigan Daily*, 7 June 2004. In fact, in the United States, not every attempt to compel subscriber identities from ISPs has proven successful. Some courts have shown that subscriber identities should not be handed over too easily. See, e.g., *Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs.*, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

⁷ See e.g. *BMG v. Doe*, *supra* note 1. It is important to note, however, that Canadian courts regularly order individuals' online identities to be revealed in other specific contexts, for example, online defamation. See e.g. *Vic Alboini and Northern Financial Corporation v. John Doe*, [2006] 06-CV-317400 PD1 (Ont. S.C.J.) per C. Campbell J (ordering a website host and Internet service providers to disclose information in an Internet defamation case).

⁸ See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, *Anonymity in the Balance*, in *DIGITAL ANONYMITY AND THE LAW* (C. Nicoll et al. eds., 2003). See generally G.T. Marx, *What's in a Name? Some Reflections on the Sociology of Anonymity*, 15(2) *INFO. SOC'Y* 99, 99-112 (1998).

⁹ William Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, act 2, sc. 1.

¹⁰ These are some of the nyms at issue in *BMG v. Doe*, *supra* note 1.

¹¹ L. Lessig, *The Path of Cyberlaw*, 104 *YALE L.J.* 1743, 1750 (1995). See also A. Michael Froomkin, *Anonymity and Its Enmities*, 1995 *J. ONLINE L.* art. 4 (June 1995), para. 46.

¹² J. Derrida, *Plato's Pharmacy*, in *DISSEMINATION* 95 (B. Johnson trans., 1981).

¹³ *Id.* at 70.

¹⁴ Roger Clark, *Famous Nyms* (Aug. 31, 2004), <http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/FamousNyms.html>.

¹⁵ Marx, *supra* note 8.

¹⁶ *Id.*

¹⁷ See Peter Biddle et al., *The Darknet and the Future of Content Distribution*, in *PROC. ACM WORKSHOP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT (2002)*, available at <http://crypto.stanford.edu/DRM2002/darknet5.doc>; Ian Clarke, *The Philosophy Behind Freenet*, <http://freenetproject.org/index.php?page=philosophy&PHPSESSID=fca0b9ec8c97a4797456a0c20a26097a>; George F. du Pont, *The Time has Come for Limited Liability for Operators of True Anonymity Remailers in Cyberspace: An Examination of the Possibilities and Perils*, 6 *FALL J. TECH. L. & POL'Y* 3 (2001); Tal Z. Zarsky, *Thinking Outside the Box:*

Considering Transparency, Anonymity, and Pseudonymity as Overall Solutions to the Problems of Information Privacy in the Internet Society, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 991 (2004).

¹⁸ Ian Kerr, *Personal Relationships in the Year 2000: Me and My ISP*, in PERSONAL

RELATIONSHIPS OF DEPENDENCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE IN LAW (Law Commission of Canada ed., 2002) 78, 110-11; Ian Kerr, *The Legal Relationship Between Online Service Providers and Users*, 35 CAN. BUS. L.J. 40 (2001) [hereinafter Kerr, *Legal Relationship*].

¹⁹ Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Association of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45, at para. 155 (LeBel, J., dissenting) [hereinafter *SOCAN v. CAIP*]. See also *Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Doe* 2000 O.J. No. 3318 (QL) (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 10-11.

²⁰ See, e.g. John Borland, *Judge: File Sharing Legal in Canada*, Cnet News.com, Mar. 31, 2004, at http://news.com.com/2102-1027_3-5182641.html?tag=st.util.print; *Keep on Swapping! Cdn File Sharers Told*, p2pnet.net News, Mar. 31, 2004, at <http://p2pnet.net/story/1118>; Tony Smith, *File Sharers Not Guilty of Copyright Infringement – Canadian Judge*, THE REGISTER, Mar.31, 2004,

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/03/31/file_sharers_not_guilty/; Gene J. Koprowski, *Canada Feds Rule Song Swapping Legal*, TECHNEWSWORLD, Apr. 1, 2004, at <http://www.technewsworld.com/story/33290.html>.

²¹ It should be noted that co-author of this chapter, Alex Cameron, was also co-counsel for CIPPIC (<http://www.cippic.ca>) in *BMG v. Doe*, *supra* note 1.

²² This is a non-profit organization that assigns IP addresses to ISPs. See <http://www.arin.net> for a description of this organization.

²³ This section primarily discusses the privacy arguments advanced before the lower court. The arguments before the appellate court were largely the same, though advanced in the context of alleging that the lower court had either erred or not erred. Complete written arguments in the case can be accessed online at <http://www.cippic.ca/file-sharing-lawsuit-docs>. A blog of the oral arguments is also available at <http://www.cippic.ca/file-sharing-lawsuits>.

²⁴ Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5, ss. 7(3)(c).

²⁵ *R. v. Dymnt*, 1988 2 S.C.R. 417 at 427-30.

²⁶ *Id.* at 429-30.

²⁷ Memorandum of Argument of the Intervener CIPPIC at para. 17-18, *BMG v. Doe*, 2004 FC 488 (No. T-292-04), available at http://www.cippic.ca/en/projects-cases/file-sharing-lawsuits/memorandum_fctd_final_12pt.pdf.

²⁸ See discussion *infra* section 2.5 of this chapter.

²⁹ 259 F. Supp 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003).

³⁰ The Court offered most of its analysis between paras. 10-42.

³¹ *BMG v. Doe*, *supra* note 1, at para. 19.

³² *Id.* at para. 20.

³³ *BMG v. Doe*, *supra* note 1, at para. 36.

³⁴ *Id.* at para. 37 (quoting *Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Doe* (2000), 12 C.P.C. (5th) 103 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) at paras. 10-11).

³⁵ *Id.* at para. 42.

³⁶ *Id.*

³⁷ *Id.* (emphasis added).

³⁸ *Id.* at para. 44.

³⁹ *Id.* at para. 4.

⁴⁰ *Id.* at para. 42.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.* at para 21.

⁴³

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* at para 21.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* at para 42.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* at para 34.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* at para 35.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* at para 36.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* at para 43.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* at para 44.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.* at para 42.

⁵³ *Ibid.* at para 45.

⁵⁴ Memorandum of Fact and Law of the Intervener CIPPIC at paras. 7 and 36, *BMG v. Doe*, *supra* note 1, *appeal filed*, No. A-T-292-04 (F.C.A. Apr. 13, 2004), *available at* <http://www.cippic.ca/en/projects-cases/file-sharing-lawsuits/CIPPIC%20FINAL%20Factum%20Aug%2010%202004.pdf>

⁵⁵ *See, e.g.*, *Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Doe* 2000 O.J. No. 3318 (QL) (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 10 (“In keeping with the protocol or etiquette developed in the usage of the internet, some degree of privacy or confidentiality with respect to the identity of the internet protocol address of the originator of a message has significant safety value and is in keeping with what should be perceived as being good public policy”); *SOCAN v. CAIP*, *supra* note 18, at para. 155 (“Privacy interests of individuals will be directly implicated where owners of copyrighted works or their collective societies attempt to retrieve data from Internet Service Providers about an end user’s downloading of copyrighted works”) (LeBel, J., dissenting).

⁵⁶ *SOCAN v. CAIP*, *supra* note 18, at para. 155 (LeBel, J., dissenting). Although Justice LeBel was discussing a test for jurisdiction, his rationale in that context seems to apply even more so to the issue of the *BMG v. Doe* threshold for compelling the disclosure of identity.

⁵⁷ For a better understanding of those heady days, see generally Kerr, *Legal Relationship*, *supra* note 17.

⁵⁸ From time to time one still hears this. *See, e.g.*, Declan McCullagh, *Verizon appeals RIAA subpoena win*, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 30, 2003 (in the context of the RIAA lawsuits in the United States, Verizon stated that it would “use every legal means to protect its subscribers’ privacy”), *at* <http://news.com.com/2100-1023-982809.html>. One may wonder whether such

litigation is motivated more by user privacy or by the administrative cost to ISPs in complying with disclosure demands.

⁵⁹ See generally Declan McCullagh, *How search engines rate on privacy*, CNET NEWS.COM, at http://news.com.com/2100-1029_3-6202068.html.

⁶⁰ See generally Alex Cameron, *Pipefitting for Privacy: Internet service providers, privacy and DRM*, Presentation to the 5th Annual Center for Intellectual Property Law and Information Technology Symposium at DePaul University College of Law: Privacy and Identity: The Promise and Perils of a Technological Age (Oct. 14, 2004).

⁶¹ Bell, Customer Privacy Policy, http://www.bell.ca/shop/en/jsp/content/cust_care/docs/bccpp.pdf.

⁶² Vidéotron, Legal Notes, at http://www.videotron.com/services/en/legal/0_4.jsp.

⁶³ See, e.g., Press Release, BCE, Bell Canada Launches the Sympatico Music Store (May 13, 2004), available at <http://www.bce.ca/en/news/releases/bc/2004/05/13/71214.html>.

⁶⁴ *Id.* Another Canadian ISP, Telus, is also offering music downloads in conjunction with Puretracks which can be accessed at <http://telus.puretracks.com/>. In addition to possibly helping to attract and retain customers, such services provide ISPs with an alternative revenue stream outside of charging a flat fee for access to the Internet.

⁶⁵ See Press Release, BCE, Bell Canada Acquires Majority Interest in Puretracks, Nation's Premiere Online Digital Music Service (1 March 2006), available at <http://www.bce.ca/en/news/releases/bcinternet/2006/03/01/73399.html>.

⁶⁶ For a description of Vidéotron's relationship with Quebecor Media Inc., see <http://www.videotron.com/services/en/videotron/9.jsp>.

⁶⁷ See <http://www.archambault.ca> for a description of this company and its services.

⁶⁸ Memorandum of Fact and Law of the Third Party Respondent Vidéotron Ltée at para.7, *BMG v. Doe*, *supra* note 1, *appeal filed*, No. A-T-292-04 (F.C.A. Apr. 13, 2004), at http://www.cippic.ca/en/projects-cases/file-sharing-lawsuits/videotron_factum.pdf.

⁶⁹ See, e.g., Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, Europ. T.S. No. 185, available at <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=185&CL=ENG>. See also Ian R. Kerr & Daphne Gilbert, *The Changing Role of ISPs in the Investigation of Cybercrime*, in *INFORMATION ETHICS IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE: CURRENT ISSUES IN AFRICA AND THE WORLD* (Thomas Mendina & Johannes Brtiz eds., 2004).

⁷⁰ Dept. of Justice et al., *Lawful Access: Consultation Document* (Aug. 25, 2002), available at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/cons/la_al/law_access.pdf. More recently, see Bill C-74: *Modernization of Investigative Techniques Act* 1st Session, 38th Parliament, 53-54 Elizabeth II, 2004-2005. Bill C-74 was not passed into law, as Parliament was dissolved before final reading of the bill.

⁷¹ "Lawful Access" is the euphemism designated to describe the Government of Canada's attempt to modernize law enforcement by expediting various forms of investigatory procedures, including procedures by which law enforcement agencies are able to more easily obtain identity information and personal communications from ISPs (in some cases without going to court). See e.g. *ibid.*

⁷² Canadian civil society groups include: On the Identity Trail (<http://www.anonequity.org>), CIPPIC (<http://www.cippic.ca>), Public Interest Advocacy Center (<http://www.piac.org>), and the B.C. Civil Liberties Association (<http://www.bccla.org/>).

⁷³ Stewart Brand, *THE MEDIA LAB: INVENTING THE FUTURE AT MIT* (1987) at 9.

⁷⁴ Biddle et al., *supra* note 16. *See also* John Borland, *Covering tracks: New privacy hope for P2P*, CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 24, 2004, at <http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5164413.html>.

⁷⁵ Lessig, *supra* note 10, at 1750.